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The End of the Networks 
Rick G. Morris1
I. THE TRADITIONAL NETWORK MODEL
At one time, traditional television networks controlled 95% of Ameri-
can viewing.  The power and strength of the networks as shapers of Ameri-
can thought and agendas was unparalleled.2  They influenced the discussion 
of America and the morals of the country through their prime time pro-
gramming.  They shaped the news that was important through editorial de-
cisions made by a few people located within blocks of each other in New 
York City.3  The concentration of power was readily apparent and it was 
publicly noted.  The power of the networks over political thinking and 
Presidential policymaking was directly criticized by Vice President Spiro 
Agnew.4  Years later another Vice President, this time Dan Quayle, would 
criticize the networks for their pervasive influence over the morals of the 
1
 J.D. University of Kansas 1985, LL.M.  New York University 1991.  Associate Dean and Asso-
ciate Professor, School of Communication, Northwestern University.  Many thanks to my research 
assistant, Brandon Grill, B.S. candidate 2007.  This research was partially funded by a grant from the 
Department of Communication Studies.  Thank you to my colleagues, professors James Webster and 
Chuck Kleinhans, who have read this work and provided comments that helped me improve it.  
2
 See generally Schurz Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1045 (7th Cir. 1992); NBC v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 206  (1943);  DAVID HALBERSTAM,  THE POWERS THAT BE (University of 
Illinois Press 2000) (1979);  DENNIS W. MAZZOCCO, NETWORKS OF POWER: CORPORATE TV’S THREAT 
TO DEMOCRACY, 2 (1994), BEN H. BAGDIKAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY, (4th ed. 1992).  Each of these 
documents reports the real and perceived domination by the networks from various viewpoints along a 
spectrum of interests.  The networks were deemed by many to be the single most powerful non-
governmental force in the country.  See also J. FRED MACDONALD, ONE NATION UNDER TELEVISION:
THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NETWORK TV (1994) for a comprehensive cultural history of network televi-
sion that ends about where this legal article picks up.  
3
 All three of the major networks were headquartered in Manhattan, and this led to charges of 
myopicism in programming.  For example, while the networks had various headquarter and operating 
locations, some of the largest ones were NBC’s location at 30 Rockefeller Plaza on 48th Street, CBS’s 
legendary headquarters known as “Blackrock” at 51 West 52nd Street, completed in 1965, and ABC 
networks’  headquarters at 77 West 66th Street.  Addresses in the early 1990’s from 1991 BROADCASTING 
Y.B.  A-40, A-41, A-50. 
4
 Vice President Spiro Agnew probably had the most famous criticism of television news power 
of commentating as disruptive of the political process and then President Nixon’s policies. “[P]erhaps no 
more than a dozen” decide what Americans will hear; they become the “presiding judge” of a national 
jury.  Spiro Agnew, U.S. Vice President, Television News Coverage (Nov. 13, 1969) (transcript available 
at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/spiroagnewtvnewscoverage.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 
2007)). 
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country in the famous Murphy Brown incident.5 All presidential candidates 
must find proper access to the networks to get elected, whether it is by pur-
chasing commercial time,6 getting into debates,7 or through a method that 
transcends both the political power and the cultural power by appearing on 
the Arsenio Hall Show and playing saxophone as did President-to-be Bill 
Clinton.8  The power of the networks has even been parodied in motion 
pictures such as Network and Wag the Dog.9  To keep this power in check, 
Congress adopted numerous rules to curb the networks’ exercise of power, 
and Congress’s delegated watchdog, the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC), focused regulatory attention on the broadcasters in a way that 
directly impacted content and free speech.10
American viewing of the networks peaked at over 90% in 1977,11 but 
the ongoing concentration of power and influence of ideas was not just 
probable and potential, but measurable and palpable.  The single most 
dominant form of video media by a factor of 9 to 100 was network televi-
sion.12  In reaction to this power, the laws enacted by Congress were perva-
sive; they included not just ownership restrictions,13 but restrictions on the 
5
 Dan Quayle, U.S. Vice President, Address to the Commonwealth Club of California (May 19, 
1992) (transcript available at http://www.vicepresidentdanquayle.com/speeches_Standing 
Firm_CCC_3.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2007)).  
It doesn't help matters when prime time TV has Murphy Brown - a character who supposedly 
epitomizes today's intelligent, highly paid, professional woman - mocking the importance of fa-
thers, by bearing a child alone, and calling it just another "lifestyle choice." I know it is not 
fashionable to talk about moral values, but we need to do it. Even though our cultural leaders in 
Hollywood; network TV, the national newspapers routinely jeer at them . . . . 
Id. 
6
 DNC v. FCC, 717 F.2d 1471, 1474 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (view of DNC); CBS v. FCC, 454 F.2d 
1018, 1020-21 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
7 See STEPHEN BATES, THE ANNENBERG WASHINGTON PROGRAM, THE FUTURE OF 
PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES 12-14 (1993), available at http://www.annenberg.northwestern.edu/pubs 
/debate/debate04.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2007). 
8 See Sam Allis, The Clinton Show, BOSTON GLOBE, June 20, 2004, at N1, available at 
http://www.boston.com/ae/books/articles/2004/06/20/the_clinton_show (last visited Jan. 1, 2007). 
9 NETWORK (MGM 1976); WAG THE DOG (New Line Cinema 1997). 
10 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400 (1969), CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 132 
(1973),   CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 397 (1981), and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 751 
(1978), are all examples where the government entered into the free speech of broadcasters and such 
action was upheld.   
11
 James G. Webster, Beneath the Veneer of Fragmentation: Television Audience Polarization in a 
Multichannel World, 55 J. COMM. 366, 366 (2005). 
12
 In 1985, network television was consumed at the rate of 985 hours per person per year, basic 
cable was consumed at the rate of 120 hours per person per year, and home video and movies were each 
15 hours per year or less.  VERONIS, SUHLER & ASSOCIATES INC., THE VERONIS, SUHLER & ASSOCIATES 
COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY FORECAST 13 (5th ann. ed. 1991). 
13 See generally 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (2005); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3615 (2005); Prometheus Radio Project 
v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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ability of the networks to reach customers,14 how much and what kind of 
political speech they could have,15 and what kinds of business they could be 
in.16  Further, their entire “product line” was heavily regulated.17
How did these businesses come to be?  They took advantage of one of 
the great government—created oligopolies—that of radio frequency spec-
trum for broadcasters.18  They had already built powerful radio networks 
and quickly sought to extend their reach into television.  That was a good 
move, since the adoption of television by consumers was remarkably fast 
with half the country owning television sets in only eight years. 19  The pre-
eminence of the networks was at a high: 
In the 1960s and 1970s the leaders of the three television networks 
stood confidently in positions of unparalleled importance. Did the 
President of the United States wield greater influence over public 
opinion than the men who would decide whether Gunsmoke or 60 
Minutes would return for another season? Even their office towers in 
mid-Manhattan were landmarks: Rockefeller Center, Broadcast 
House.  And the top-floor executive suites were regally appointed 
homes for Broadcast Barons, the royalty of America’s new, electronic 
age.20
It has long been thought that the spectrum that composed these “chan-
nels” was scarce and limited, and that only a finite number of channels 
could exist in any city.21  Congress set up the basic allocations of spectrum 
14 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a)(1) (2005) (national TV ownership rule, caps reach of U.S. TV Households 
to 35%, later modified to 39%, but not yet posted to the Code of Federal Regulations); Stuart Minor 
Benjamin, Evaluating the Federal Communications Commission’s National Television Ownership Cap: 
What’s Bad for Broadcasting is Good for the Country, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 441 (2004). 
See also Frank Ahrens, Compromise Puts TV Ownership Cap at 39%, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2003, at 
A19, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A12074-2003Nov24.   
The FCC is currently undertaking a review of many of the ownership rules, but it is not reviewing 
the national television ownership cap of 39% as approved by the court in the Prometheus case, 373 F.3d 
372.  2006 Quadrennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules 
and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 21 F.C.C.R. 
8834, at n.11 (proposed July 24, 2006).
15
 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2000). 
16
 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a)(1) (2005) (radio ownership rules); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(c) (2005) 
(newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rules). 
17 See generally 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.670, 73.671, 73.673 (2005) (children’s television rules); 47 
C.F.R. § 73.3999 (indecency rules); 47 C.F.R. § 73.4000 (listing of major FCC policies). 
18
 The term “radio frequency spectrum” is used in this article in accordance with the usual term of 
art and includes all spectrum use including for television, radio, digital, and other uses. 
19
  John Carey, The First 100 Feet for Households: Consumer Adoption Patterns, in THE FIRST 
100 FEET 42 (Deborah Hurley & James H. Keller eds., 1999).  
20
  JOEL BRINKLEY, DEFINING VISION: THE BATTLE FOR THE FUTURE OF TELEVISION 6 (1997).   
21
 R.H. Coase  is the originator of economic criticism of the functioning of the FCC and its spec-
trum policies. R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959).  A 
33
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and let the FCC assign channels to each locality.  The FCC did so with ex-
tensive analysis and consideration.  Allocations varied from one per market 
to as many as twenty-one per market.22 These allocations varied in quality.  
A UHF channel, for example, was highly undesirable; so even in a city with 
many channels, perhaps half or more were of limited commercial viability 
because they were in the UHF band.23  The desirable channels, the ones that 
a network could make money on, were in the VHF band.  And the net-
works, to the greatest extent possible, sought out the prime VHF channels 
in the largest cities.24  The networks were early movers on the best frequen-
cies. 
leading analyst of spectrum scarcity, Thomas W. Hazlett presents a First Amendment-based critique in  
Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First Amendment, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 905 
(1997).  His latest work on the subject is Thomas W. Hazlett, Spectrum Tragedies, 22 YALE J. ON REG.
242 (2005).  For a technical criticism of the doctrine of spectrum scarcity, see Gregory Staple & Kevin 
Werbach, The End of Spectrum Scarcity, IEEE SPECTRUM, March 2004, at 48.  
22
 For example, as of 1990 the New York market (which consists of parts of New York, New 
Jersey and Connecticut) was attributed twenty-one stations by Arbitron, and Zanesville, Ohio, the 199th
market, was attributed one station. 1990 BROADCASTING Y.B. C204. 
 A “market” in broadcasting is one or more cities located geographically close and determined to be 
a market by one of the commercial rating services (e.g., Arbitron, http://www.arbitron.com, and Nielsen, 
http://www.nielsen.com) or the FCC by its own calculations.  The FCC and the commercial ratings 
services can give different results on which stations are included in a market, and this phenomenon has 
been noted by the FCC as being somewhat problematic. Definition of Radio Markets, MM Docket No. 
00-244, FCC 00-427, at 3 (proposed December 13, 2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/mb/ 
policy/docs/fcc00427.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2007). 
 For the purposes of this paper, the author will be referring to the markets as determined by Arbitron 
and listed in 1990 BROADCASTING Y.B. § C.  These are industry-accepted definitions of the markets and 
are one definition recognized by the FCC and incorporated by reference into the FCC regulations.  See, 
e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 76.55(e) (2005). 
23
 The television channels are each 6 MHZ wide and extend from Channel 2, which begins at 54 
MHZ, to the top channel, channel 69, at 608 MHZ.  The channels are not continuous; there are many 
services located between some channels including FM radio (88-108MHZ) and many land mobile 
services. OFFICE OF SPECTRUM MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STOCK. NO. 003-000-00691-3, 
UNITED STATES FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS: THE RADIO SPECTRUM (2003), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/allochrt.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2007). 
During the early years, not all televisions could even receive the UHF channels (14-83) until Con-
gress passed the All Channel Receiver Act, Pub. L. No. 87-529, 76 Stat. 150 (1962).  Further, the lower 
the channel, the better the reception tended to be in early televisions.   
24
 To some extent, the networks even tried to stay on the same channel from city to city. For 
example, CBS is on channel 2 in New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago; NBC is on channel 4 or 5 in 
those largest markets, and ABC is on channel 7 in all of the largest markets.  Channel allocations from 
1998 BROADCASTING Y.B. B-9, B-25. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court had told us that spectrum was scarce.25  And 
the concept of spectrum scarcity was a useful one for the government.  The 
Supreme Court told us that because of this spectrum scarcity, the First 
Amendment protections that provide significant protections to the print 
media could be brushed aside by Congress and the electronic media could 
be more strictly regulated.26  The FCC followed closely and used “spectrum 
scarcity” as an excuse to set aside the First Amendment during regulatory 
proceedings.27  While many have criticized the concept of spectrum scar-
city,28 it is still the primary justification for regulating the networks and 
broadcasters.29  The importance of spectrum scarcity cannot be over-
estimated.  While it provided a mechanism to the government for strict 
regulation, it also limited the entry of competition.  This structural oligop-
25 See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943).  
The plight into which radio fell prior to 1927 was attributable to certain basic facts about radio as a 
means of communication—its facilities are limited; they are not available to all who may wish to 
use them; the radio spectrum simply is not large enough to accommodate everybody. There is a 
fixed natural limitation upon the number of stations that can operate without interfering with one 
another. Regulation of radio was therefore as vital to its development as traffic control was to the 
development of the automobile. In enacting the Radio Act of 1927, the first comprehensive scheme 
of control over radio communication, Congress acted upon the knowledge that if the potentialities 
of radio were not to be wasted, regulation was essential.  
Id.  
26
  United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (each media receives its own 
rules and there are lesser standards because of spectrum scarcity).  
27
 For the different treatment among First Amendment speakers by the Supreme Court, compare 
Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), which gave strong protections to print media, with Red 
Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), which overrode First Amendment protections for 
broadcasters based on the theory of spectrum scarcity.  This differential treatment has been analyzed and 
critiqued by numerous scholars.  See, e.g., THOMAS G. KRATTEMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE JR.,
REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING (1994), chapters 7 and 8.  For some of the regulations on 
broadcast speech, see generally 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (2005) (regulations on indecency); 47 C.F.R. § 
73.4095 (2005) (drug lyrics); 47 C.F.R. § 73.4050 (2005) (children’s TV programs); 47 C.F.R. § 73.4165 
(2005) (obscene language); 47 C.F.R. § 73.4170 (2005) (obscene broadcasts).  
28
 Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity: Idle Spectrum as a First Amendment Violation, 52 
DUKE L.J. 1, 110 (2002). 
29
 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731 n.2 (1978); FCC v. League of Women Voters of 
California, 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990) overruled by
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 
622, 637 (1994). Metro Broadcasting was overruled on other grounds (race) by Pena, but it is still a 
good explanation of spectrum scarcity.  The concept of spectrum scarcity as a regulatory tool was re-
stated after Pena by the Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997).  The Third Circuit 
recently used spectrum scarcity as a substantive basis for its decision in Prometheus Radio Project v. 
FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 4811 (June 13, 2005). However, see 
contra Christopher Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology Specific Approach to the First Amend-
ment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245 (2003) for an extensive argument that the doctrine of spectrum scarcity is dying 
by implication of its non-use by the U.S. Supreme Court in some pre-2003 cases.  This author believes 
that the later-decided Prometheus case (and the denial of certiorari) is an indication of the continuing 
viability of spectrum scarcity for use by the courts unless and until it is specifically overruled by the 
Supreme Court.   
34
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oly, created by the government, meant that the competition had to scramble 
for the few remaining good channels, or settle for sub-standard UHF chan-
nels. Because of the limitations on the quality of channels, until cable tele-
vision became dominant in the 1990’s, no new networks were able to sur-
vive.30
The original networks were also well-funded in an industry that was 
understood by few sources of lending.  They had their existing radio net-
works that threw off enough cash to start the television networks.  Once 
they owned enough stations on their own, they signed contracts with addi-
tional independently—owned stations, called “affiliates,” to create wide 
area networks of interconnected stations.  The networks started as CBS and 
NBC, who were eventually joined by ABC.31  These three powerful entities 
controlled culture, news, and, some believed, much of the American 
agenda.32
The networks consisted of the “owned and operated” stations plus af-
filiates.  The owned and operated stations (O & Os) were the pick stations 
of each network, anchored by stations in each of the three largest markets 
(New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago) plus other selected markets.  Each 
network bought stations in markets it considered strategic to bring it close 
to the national cap of 25% to 39%33 of viewers.  The networks then ex-
tended their coverage to essentially 100% of the country through affiliation 
agreements with locally owned or group owned stations.  These agreements 
gave the networks de facto control of all of the important programming 
time periods of their affiliates. 
Over time, cable systems arose to expand broadcast signals and found 
a business by providing some of their own programming.  Although cable 
was the ultimate leader of the decline of the networks, at first it was the 
30
 Some tried, for example, the DuMont network.  http://www.museum.tv/archives 
/etv/D/htmlD/DuMont/DuMont.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2007).  But the first additional network to com-
pete in a complete and long-term way was the Fox network, which started broadcasting in 1986 and rose 
to be viable after it had added several nights of programming and more affiliates.  The Fox network’s 
affiliates were mostly on the UHF band, 1998 BROADCASTING AND CABLE Y.B. B141-B143, and cable 
television was the great equalizer that permitted Fox to thrive.  When a viewer watches on cable, there is 
no difference between VHF stations and UHF stations.  Therefore, cable might have been the factor that 
permitted a new network to finally compete and succeed. Other networks have formed and consolidated; 
for example, the WB and UPN network are combining into the CW network during the Fall of 2006. See
Paul R. Lamonica, The CW: One Plus One Doesn’t Equal Three, CNN MONEY, Nov. 10, 2006, 
http://money.cnn.com/2006/11/10/news/companies/cw/?postversion=2006111012 (last visited Jan. 1, 
2007).   
31
 The ABC radio network was created by the breakup of the NBC networks and eventually added 
television.  See The Museum of Broadcast Communications, American Broadcasting Company, 
http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/A/htmlA/americanbroa/americanbroa.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2007). 
32
 See supra notes 3-6. 
33
 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(c)(1)(B), 110 Stat. 111 (1996), 
amended by Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat. 99 (2004) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2005).  
Originally capped at 35%, Congress has intervened to set the cap at 39%. 
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great enabler for them.  The most important function of cable systems in the 
early days was to extend the signal of the broadcast networks.  HBO, CNN, 
and other original cable programming had not yet become popular.34
Reaching essentially 100% of the country and providing the main ac-
cess to news through their own content filters,35 the networks held the ulti-
mate power in communications media.  No one would have predicted the 
rapid and permanent decline, yet the networks all knew it was coming and 
they each prepared in their own way. 
Although network evening news programs maintain a loyal viewer 
base, the availability of news via cable television twenty-four hours a day 
allows people to have a continuous portal to the news world and guaranteed 
coverage in times of crisis. The world of media now has people turning to 
cable, not network news, for continuous coverage in times of crisis.36  The 
television shows winning the most Emmys are from cable, not networks, 
and the opening musical number of the 2006 Emmys tells the audience that 
the networks have trouble with their ratings.37  The most instantaneous news 
is now coming from the Internet, not the networks.  The most active media 
websites are owned by anyone except the networks.38  And people who 
want great commentary and editorials look first to the blogs.  The end of the 
34
 Extension of local broadcast signals was one goal of cable television as late as 1968. United 
States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 161 (1968).  CNN started its satellite service in 1980. 
http://turner.com/about/corporate_history.html; http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/H/htmlH/homeboxoffi/ 
homeboxoffi.htm. 
35
 Webster, supra note 11, at 374. 
36
 Tom Bierbaum et al., Attack Coverage Brings Ratings Surge for Cable Nets, CABLE WORLD,
Sept. 17, 2001, at 10.  See also Cable News vs. Network News Viewership 1997-2005,
http://www.journalism.org/node/1363.  While absolute ratings of network news still beats cable news, in 
times of crisis, viewers tend to choose cable’s continuous coverage. 
37
 HBO, a cable network, won the most Emmys in 2006 with 26. 
http://www.emmys.com/media/releases/2006/rel_pte58_winners.pdf. 
As an example of the depth of concern about the change in the marketplace by the declining net-
works, host Conan O’Brien’s opening number was a parody of “T for Trouble” from the musical The 
Music Man, and the lyrics lamented the falling network ratings. 58th Primetime Emmy Awards (NBC 
television broadcast Aug. 27, 2006). 
See also http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KHv8IACWSpM&mode=related&search=; WALL ST.
J., Oct. 20, 2006, at W1, W8.  NBC may have the most problems with ratings as noted in TV and Ad 
Industries Warily Weigh In On NBC’s Plans to Revamp Prime Time, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2006, at B1.  
“NBC’s signal that it will abandon high cost dramas and comedies in the first hour of prime time – once 
unthinkable – is both a risky decision and a sign that yet another of network TV’s seemingly immutable 
laws may be crumbling.”  Yet the same article goes on to say that rival CBS “is less visionary in sight 
than a desperate measure” and that it “shouldn’t suggest an industry trend.”  At about the same time, 
NBC announced that it was trimming 700 jobs and cutting annual operating expenses by $750 million.  
Reuters, CNET News.com, October 19, 2006, http://news.com.com/NBC+Unive 
sal+to+launch+iVillage+TV+show/2100-1026_3-6140789.html. 
38
 According to website traffic analysis company Alexa, Yahoo! has an average reach (where 
reach is defined as the percentage of 1,000,000 Internet users that would visit the site) of 282,350 over 
three months.  Google has a three-month reach of 270,950, and MSN has a reach of 245,650 (as of 
November 22, 2006), http://www.alexa.com/#traffic (follow “Traffic Rankings” hyperlink; then enter 
Yahoo, Google, or MSN as search terms). 
35
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networks is here and the remainder of this article traces how that has hap-
pened.
II. THE LAW OF THE TRADITIONAL NETWORKS
The television (and radio) networks were, and still are, regulated by 
the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.  The rules used to be strict, 
based upon notions that the networks, although not a monopoly, still pos-
sessed sufficient market power that close government regulation was re-
quired.  Further, the networks were national in scope, and the reach and 
impact of their speech was recognized.  For both reasons, the government 
tightly regulated the networks.  The most important government rules 
shaped the structure of the network marketplace. 
In addition to the ownership limitations mentioned previously, there 
was a number of “conduct” rules that governed the network-affiliate rela-
tionship.  Some of these rules included the limitations on affiliation agree-
ments,39 the exclusive affiliation of the station,40 and option time.41  These 
rules were intended to protect the affiliate stations from network over-
reaching, to provide some independence of the affiliates from the networks, 
and to provide some choice to listeners.  Another structural limitation on 
national network programming was the Prime Time Access Rule.42  The 
purpose of the Prime Time Access Rule was to encourage local production 
of programming and independent syndication.  Prime Time Access has re-
sulted in the success of such programs as Jeopardy and Wheel of Fortune.
The intent of the rule was to create a mandatory “hole” void of network 
programming that would then have to be filled with local programming, or 
at least programming from independent producers.   
The most significant rules that limited network reach and speech were 
known as the Financial Interest and Syndication rules or “Fin-Syn” for 
short.  Codified in 47 C.F.R. § 73.658, the Fin-Syn rules prohibited net-
works from owning more than three hours per week of prime-time pro-
gramming (7-11 P.M. EDT) other than feature films, children’s program-
ming, news programs, or certain other categories43 of programming. 
The effect of the Fin-Syn rules was to create a marketplace for inde-
pendent television producers.  Production companies such as Spelling Pro-
ductions, MTM Enterprises, and Stephen J. Cannell productions arose or 
prospered due to this rule.   
39
 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (1990). 
40
 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(a) (1990). 
41
 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(d) (1990). 
42
 Competition and Responsibility in Network Television Broads., 23 F.C.C. 2d 382, 384 (1970) 
(amendment of part 73 of rules and regulations). 
43 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j) (1990).   
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Finally, the networks were limited in their lines of business through 
the cross-ownership rules.  These rules were intended to diversify the num-
ber of voices in the “marketplace of ideas.”  The cross-ownership restric-
tions prohibited broadcast stations from being owned by or owning a local 
daily newspaper44 and from owning the local cable system.45  Broadcast 
stations were supposed to be independent media. 
The viewer experience for the traditional network model is shown in 
illustration number one.46 
 
Chart 1: Traditional Network Model 
 
III. EROSION OF THE NETWORKS: PUBLIC POLICY MEETS THE 
MARKETPLACE 
A. The Cable Communications Act of 1984 
 
The Cable Communications Act of 1984 was a “tipping point” for 
broadcasters including the networks.  The 1984 Act formalized the regula-
tion of cable television, gave Congress’s approval of a regulatory structure 
                                                                                                                           
 
44
 See generally FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978).  The cross owner-
ship rules are once again under review in the present proceedings on ownership.  See supra notes 14-16. 
 
45
 See supra note 16. 
46
 This view of network relationships owes its inspiration to all of those who have come before it 
including: BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS 6 (1992); Mark S. Nadel, U.S. 
Communications Policymaking: Who & Where, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 273, 290 (1991). 
Traditional Networks: 
Owned and Operated Stations and Affiliates 
Original Programming 
News 
 Independent Stations 
Including public stations (PBS) 
 
Cable Television 
 
 
 
Viewers 
36
64 FIU Law Review [2:55
for cable, and placed on a firm footing the first real competitor to the net-
works.  Prior to the Act, cable was regulated by the FCC without statutory 
authority and pursuant to a patchwork of guidance by the appeals courts.47
After the Act, cable systems had a reasonable expectation of franchise re-
newal and a reasonably favorable regulatory structure providing a suffi-
ciently friendly environment that cable began to thrive. 
B. The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act 
of 1992 
Shortly after the 1984 Act, which was thought to be favorable to the 
cable operators, cable began to thrive a bit too much.  Consumers were out-
raged by high rate increases which encouraged Congress to re-examine 
cable regulation and to proceed to an enactment in 1992.  The 1992 Act 
provided an esoteric provision called “Must Carry – Retransmission Con-
sent.”48  While the intention of the provision was to protect broadcast sta-
tions and networks’ viability by requiring cable systems to carry them, the 
net effect was to put the cable operators and the networks at odds with each 
other.  The cable systems, rather than being an enabler of the networks, 
turned into an adversary of the networks.  The incentives in the 1992 Act 
ended up in cable systems (the distribution medium) favoring the program-
ming of their co-owned cable networks over that of the traditional broadcast 
networks.   
C. The Schurz Communications v. FCC case makes major changes 
The Schurz49 case overturned the Fin-Syn rules and forever changed 
the landscape of network television.  The Fin-Syn rules created an artificial 
environment for television production by forbidding networks from owning 
most of the television shows50 that they ran during their best hours, prime-
47
 United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) (basic jurisdiction); U.S. v. Midwest Video 
Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 659 (1972) (reasonable regulation); FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 
(1979) (Commission went too far in some regulations); Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394 
(1974) (cable is a service to the viewers and does not violate copyright since the viewer could do the 
same thing).
48
 47 U.S.C. § 534 (1992) (amended 1996) (must carry); 47 U.S.C. § 325(b) (1992) (amended 
1999, 2004) (retransmission consent). 
49
 Schurz Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1992). 
50
 Fin-Syn prohibited participation from the three broadcast networks in the following areas: 
networks were not allowed to take financial interest from any programs they aired (beyond the first 
airing) and the networks were banned from the creation of in-house syndication arms.  The goal was to 
eliminate the incentives for the networks to produce programs and to effectively separate production 
from distribution.  The rules also served to prevent networks from storing the programs they owned to 
force syndication on owned and operated affiliates. See generally Fin-Syn Rules, 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j) 
(1990).   
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time.51  The goal was to provide a marketplace for independent production 
by forcing the networks to purchase their programming from others.  The 
network programming marketplace was dominated by the three networks 
which had control of the only three nationwide commercial distribution 
networks.52  With few outlets to supply programs to, the supply chain for 
network programming was concentrated at both ends.  The court in Schurz
overturned this provision of the regulatory structure of the networks and set 
them free to own the programming that they were showing.  This permitted 
networks to concentrate on the content as the valuable, reusable, and ex-
ploitable asset.  Once they were able to do this, the distribution network 
became less important.  The money a network made shifted from having 
powerful distribution networks to having powerful programs.  In fact, the 
traditional “distribution network” of reliance on local affiliates became a 
liability that the networks began to look at reshaping or even abandoning.53
D. The rise of the Internet 1996-2006 
The Internet was invented as ARPANET in 1969.54  It was a creation of 
the defense department and remained that way until 1992 when Congress 
authorized the use of the network for commercial purposes.55  Even after 
commercial use was authorized, the Internet did not really take off until two 
technological advances converged. The first was the invention of “HTML” 
or hyper text markup language that permitted embedding the familiar 
“links” that take us to new sites.  The second technology needed was the 
graphical web browser invented at the NCSA at the University of Illinois 
and popularized as the Mosaic and Netscape web browsers.  Once the web 
browsers were graphical and easy-to-use and HTML added the special util-
ity of linking, the Internet was ready to take off.  Those two technological 
developments converged in about 1995, making 1996 to 2006 one of the 
most exciting decades of technological and intellectual development.  The 
Internet permits the instantaneous exchange of information and data in any 
form.  While the slow speed of the networks accessible by the average per-
son created a bottleneck for full media development of the Internet, the 
rising use of broadband from 2000 forward has made interchange of pro-
51
 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1990) (prime time access rule).  This rule specified that “prime time” is 
from 7:00PM to 11:00PM in the Eastern and Pacific time zones, and from 6:00PM to 10:00PM in the 
Central and Mountain time zones.
52
 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j) (1990).  
53 See Steve McClellan, Small Towns, Big Problems, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 6, 2001, at 
20.   
54
 LILLIAN GOLENIEWSKI, TELECOMMUNICATIONS ESSENTIALS 242 (2001). 
55
 Information Infrastructure and Technology Act of 1992, S. Res. 2937, 102d Cong. (1992) 
(enacted). 
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gram material easy for the average person.56  It is now an everyday occur-
rence for many people to view some sort of media, either audio or video, on 
a daily basis.57
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE END
Two excellent means of measuring the impact and success of the net-
works has been the network share and the total time spent viewing.  Both of 
these metrics have been tracked for decades by the AC Nielsen Company.58
The share of a network is the percentage of televisions that are on and 
watching a network.  Because it does not count televisions that are off it is a 
good measure that self-adjusts for daily and seasonal viewing habits.  Cu-
mulatively, the three network shares in 1985 were over 69%.59  Over the 
years the three network shares have consistently fallen, reaching 29% in 
2002.60  Important points along the way included when cable television 
passed the broadcast television network share in 1990.61
A second measure is the time spent viewing.62  While the average 
number of hours spent viewing television as a whole continues to increase, 
the growth is not due to the traditional broadcast networks.  The time spent 
viewing network-affiliated stations peaked in 1993, declining from 920 
hours (per person, per year) in 1993 to 726 in 2006, with a record low of 
56
   In their annual study on video competition, the FCC noted that broadband video is growing:
The amount of web-based video provided over the Internet continues to increase significantly each 
year. The overall number of homes with access to the Internet continues to grow, as does the num-
ber of Americans who access the Internet via a high-speed broadband connection. As of June 
2005, there were approximately 33.7 million high-speed residential Internet access subscribers, 
representing approximately 48 percent of the 70.3 million residential Internet subscription house-
holds. 
Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, 
Twelfth Annual Report, MB Docket No. 05-255, FCC 06-11, at 7 (March 3, 2006), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-06-11A1.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2007). 
 Further, Arbitron, which runs regular studies on Internet media usage, finds in its latest study that the 
weekly Internet radio and video users have increased 50% over the last year.  ARBITRON, INTERNET AND 
MULTIMEDIA 2006: ON DEMAND MEDIA EXPLODES 5 (2006).  They also found that given a choice 
between eliminating either Internet or television from their lives, the majority of 12-to-34 year olds 
would eliminate television, id. at 6, and that approximately 30% of Americans say they are spending 
less time with traditional media due to time spent online, id. at 12.  Nearly 47 million Americans, or 
20%, watched Internet video last month.  Id. at 18.
57
 ARBITRON, ELECTRONIC AUDIENCE MEASUREMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2003), available 
at http://www.arbitron.com/downloads/IntlPPMOverview.pdf. 
58
 http://www.nielsenmedia.com (last visited Jan. 16, 2007). 
59
 Webster, supra note 11, at 368. 
60
 Id.
61
 Id.
62
 VERONIS SUHLER STEVENSON, COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY FORECAST & REPORT 51 (18th ed. 
& 22d ed. 2004). 
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704 hours in 2003.63  In contrast, the number of hours spent using consumer 
Internet continues to increase—from 1 hour (per person, per year) in 1990 
to 213 hours in 2006.64  The fall in network share and the time spent view-
ing television has been traceable and accompanied by increases elsewhere.  
The share of cable television viewing has continuously gone up, and the 
time spent using computers has gone up.  This change is known as a substi-
tution effect.65  It shows how the use of media has shifted. 
This shift in the use of media is caused by the fragmentation of the au-
dience caused by an increased number of media sources competing for a 
slowly growing number of audience members.  The audience is making 
choices on the relative value of each source with its taste shifting towards 
cable and Internet and away from television.66
The concept of declining market share was not a new one to the lead-
ership of television networks.  Their share had been declining since their 
peak in 1977.67  Also, network executives could watch a similar decline in 
the case of the telephone industry and the breakup of AT&T.  AT&T’s mar-
ket share at the time of the breakup in 1984 was 98.5%.  MCI, Sprint, and 
the other competitors to AT&T helped propel AT&T’s (continuous) market 
share decline.  The public policy exacted in the breakup of AT&T—that 
consumers have a choice of competing telephone providers—directly led to 
the decline in market share by AT&T.  No perceived excellence of service 
could overcome the consumer-friendly attributes of choice and price created 
by the new public policies.  The decline of AT&T was clearly visible and a 
lesson to the networks. 
After the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, it was clear that 
Congress was positioning cable as a competitor to broadcast television.  
Further, the courts entered the marketplace of competition by directing the 
repeal of the must carry rules68 and the Fin-Syn rules.69  The must carry 
rules provided at best a reasonably level playing field.  Finally, cable televi-
sion received the signals of the broadcast stations for free, giving them a 
competitive advantage.70
63
 VERONIS, SUHLER & ASSOCIATES, INC., THE VERONIS, SUHLER & ASSOCIATES 
COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY REPORT 40 (14th ann. ed. 1996); VERONIS SUHLER STEVENSON,
COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY FORECAST & REPORT 54 (18th ed. & 22d ed. 2004).
64
 VERONIS, SUHLER & ASSOCIATES, INC., THE VERONIS, SUHLER & ASSOCIATES 
COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY REPORT 41 (14th ann. ed. 1996); VERONIS SUHLER STEVENSON,
COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY FORECAST & REPORT 55 (18th ed. & 22d ed. 2004). 
65
 OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 46. 
66 See VERONIS SUHLER STEVENSON, COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY FORECAST & REPORT 55
(18th ed. & 22d ed. 2004). 
67
 Webster, supra note 11, at 366. 
68
 See sources cited supra note 48. 
69
 See generally Schurz Commc’ns v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1992). 
70
 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
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The prior changes in the marketplace were visible to the networks.  In 
response, or perhaps in observation of the changing marketplace, all of 
them tried to launch cable ventures.71  Some were more successful than 
others.72  NBC recognized that it needed to protect its core business (televi-
sion network) as much as possible, yet it also faced the imperatives of the 
growing competition and needed to either play or die.  Either by success in 
launching channels, or by merger and acquisition,73 or a combination of 
both, all three of the networks eventually found their place among the cable 
networks and became multimedia giants.  CBS and Viacom merged (and 
separated again), ABC and Disney merged, and NBC and Universal 
merged.  Each retained its identity, yet all three knew they needed to be in 
all of the media marketplaces. 
Therefore by 1990, the networks understood their path.  Market share 
was in a permanent decline.  The tradition of the networks, able to spend 
any amount of money on anything from news bureaus around the world to 
spectacular prime time programming to unlimited sports-rights, were feel-
ing the rug pulled out from under them.  Networks began to talk about be-
ing “distribution agnostic.” This was a major change.  It meant that the net-
works would distribute their programming by means other than exclusive 
contracts with their over-the-air affiliates.74  It meant they were shifting 
from a virtually independent production-distribution oligopoly to a content 
provider who would compete in various forms of distribution.  The spec-
trum their stations operated on was still immensely valuable, but it would 
no longer be their only lifeline or their only stream of revenue. 
Throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s, the market share has con-
tinued to decline.  Cable networks have grown from a few dozen in number 
to 531 in 2005.75  Furthermore, over 77% of cable subscribers receive 36 or 
more channels.76  And the networks have all completed major mergers. 
71
 CBS launched “CBS Eye on People,” NBC launched “MSNBC” and “CNBC,” and ABC 
launched “ABC Entertainment” and “ABC Family.”  ABC and NBC also own several sports channels. 
72
 CBS’s “Eye” failed, yet “ABC Family” and “CNBC” continue to thrive. 
73
 Most notably, the merger between AOL/Time Warner and ABC created a telecommunications 
conglomerate of Internet service, print media, CNN, ABC, Disney, ESPN, and more.  See Stephen 
Labaton, F.T.C. Review of AOL Deal in Final Stage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2000, at C1. 
74
 One of the first major moves to bring in other distribution forums was the NBC TripleCast.  
The TripleCast had the traditional broadcast network coverage supplemented by a cable network and a 
pay-per-view offering.  The TripleCast was not a financial success, but it set the stage for networks to 
change their exclusive distribution through affiliates.   Richard Zoglin, How Much Is Too Much?, TIME,
Aug. 10, 1992.  Eventually, the networks figured out they could charge their affiliates “reverse compen-
sation” for carrying their programming. McClellan, supra note 53.   
75 Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Pro-
gramming, Twelfth Annual Report, MB Docket No. 05-255, FCC 06-11, at 73 (March 3, 2006), avail-
able at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-06-11A1.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2007). 
76
 2005 FCC ANN. REP. 11.  FCC Report No. CS 97-30 states that (according to one commenter) 
the average number of cable channels increased in 1997 to 49.4.  
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Along the way, the business formulas of the media organizations have 
changed.  Instead of focusing all of their own resources on one single net-
work, production budgets are more spread across broadcast, high definition, 
multiple cable and Internet production.  Prime time has shifted from expen-
sive dramas (Dallas, ER) and comedies (Cosby, Seinfeld) to cheaper news 
(Dateline) and reality (Fear Factor, Wife Swap, Survivor), programs that do 
not have expensive talent and production costs. 
The changes are permanent; there is no turning back.  The marketplace 
is restructuring further with cable on-demand and near-on-demand video 
offerings.  The rise of the computer as a complementary media source and 
perhaps a primary media source is irreversible.  Not only are networks driv-
ing their over-the-air viewers to their website, an act that was unthinkable a 
few short years ago, but they are providing both extended and original pro-
gramming via the web.77
There are other signs of the permanence of the new marketplace.  For 
example, Monday Night Football has come to an end on the networks.78  A 
show that was invented by broadcast television and one that practically 
saved the ABC network from oblivion has now moved to cable television 
where it will yield higher revenue with smaller audiences for the Dis-
ney/ABC/ESPN conglomerate and signal the final death of broadcast net-
works permanently. 
V. NEO NETWORKING
“Networks” continue, although in a different form.  The public’s thirst 
for entertainment, news, and sports continues, and it grows.  But the net-
working of 2006 would not have been recognized in 1990. 
Networking has shifted from distribution-centric, where the mere abil-
ity to deliver to millions of people constituted a network, to a more amor-
phous, but perhaps more powerful form.  This new form, satisfying the in-
terest of the media consumer, I call neo-networking.  Attributes of neo-
networking include multiple platforms for delivery, content-centric interest 
generation, interactivity, and mobility. 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/News_Releases/1997/nrcb7023.html (Dec. 15, 1997) (last visited 
Jan. 1, 2007). 
77 Associated Press, YouTube Signs Content Deals With Big Players, MSNBC, Oct. 9, 2006, 
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/15196228 (last visited Jan. 1, 2007).  YouTube signed deals with CBS, Sony 
BMG Music, and Vivendi’s Universal Music group for content distribution.  The convergence of tradi-
tional and developing media can be seen by CBS’s move to add YouTube as a distribution medium.  
CBS Corp. said it will provide short form video content for a CBS “brand channel” on YouTube’s site 
starting “this month” (referring to October 2006). 
78
 Leonard Shapiro & Mark Maske, ‘Monday Night Football’ Changes the Channel, WASH. POST,
Apr. 19, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A63538-
2005Apr18.html. 
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Neo-networking does not care about distribution media.  In fact, pro-
gramming might be delivered or deliverable in several ways.  A program 
might be available for watching at a time certain just like traditional televi-
sion—or it might be downloaded to an iPod and watched on your train ride 
to work.  It might arrive via an over-the-air broadcasting, or it might come 
by cable, satellite, Internet, WAP, WiFi, or any other delivery means.  Even 
within a delivery system, the lines might still be blurred—a program is just 
as usable if delivered as regular video, over cable, or as a very different 
digital download creating a file using the Internet broadband technology of 
many cable providers.  The viewer/interactor is growing.  Almost fifty mil-
lion Americans have watched Internet television.79
The new business models require aggregation of product value across 
platforms.  Some of the platforms might be advertising-supported, like web-
sites and traditional broadcast.  Some may be supported by user fees such as 
cable.  And break-even can be elusive in source media, therefore the need 
for aggregation of revenues across platforms.  If content is the new genera-
tor of networks, then the producers needed to find a way to “charge” the 
audience for access to the content.  The main problem of the neo-networks 
will be how to make a sufficient profit.80
Rather than having “appointment TV,” the neo-network viewer has a 
choice.  He or she can watch on-time traditional network fare or find the 
same video downloadable to their iPod, playable on-demand on either cable 
or by using a Digital Video Recorder (DVR) such as Tivo, or by viewing it 
in a portable version over either a cellular or WiFi network.  This wide 
range of choices demonstrates that the business is no longer predicated on 
having exclusive distribution networks for which you can charge, to having 
exclusive content for which the viewer is willing to pay either through di-
rect payments or by watching advertising. 
Even the old one-way network of cable has moved toward neo-
networking with their “triple play” offerings of cable television, Internet 
access, and voice over IP telephone; they seek to provide all of the plat-
forms home consumers could want and they offer content on each of those 
platforms.  Some companies now also offer a “quad play” that adds cellular 
telephone to their united offering to make sure the customer is constantly 
able to download or view.81
79
 ARBITRON/EDISON MEDIA RESEARCH, INTERNET AND MULTIMEDIA 2006: ON-DEMAND MEDIA 
EXPLODES 18 (2006),  http://www.arbitron.com/downloads/im2006study.pdf. 
80
 Profit from advertising on websites and other forms of non-traditional forms of media delivery 
is elusive.  A few companies such as AOL, Google, and Yahoo have found ways to generate significant 
revenue from Internet advertising.  For the most part, however, Internet advertising is often thrown in as 
a bonus to other advertising, or else charged at very modest rates.   
81
 One leader in the area of cell phone programming is Verizon with its “V-cast” offering.  
http://getitnow.vzwshop.com/index.aspx?id=video (last visited Jan. 7, 2007). 
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Neo-networks are more than just multiple platforms of downloading; 
they also make true interactivity with individual contribution to the network 
possible.  This contributed networking can be as simple as being driven to a 
show’s website by promised extra content.  This content can be a repeat of 
the broadcast material or it can be extensions of the broadcast including 
additional factual or fictional material, deleted scenes, or extra scenes.  It 
can also include two-dimensional interactivity such as weblogs where the 
viewer can leave comments and read the comments of others. 
The next step up in interactive neo-networks is the fully contributory 
content sites where you can post your own material.  These sites, such as 
YouTube82 or Google Video,83 permit the user to upload 3-D interactivity, a 
real video.  This video can be related to a topic of discussion, it can be a 
television show,84 or it can be an original work of any sort.  The circle is 
now closing as the broadcast and cable media are becoming referent to the 
online contributory media. For example, VH1, a traditional cable network, 
has a weekly show that highlights clip programming from the Internet 
sites.85  Participation as a contribution can be either complex or very simple 
and the webcam and software to become the best intensive contributor is 
available for less than 100 dollars. 
A network that accepts contributions breaks down the barriers to entry 
that the traditional networks forced for seventy years.  It also further frac-
tionalizes the audience and makes revenue generation more difficult. 
MySpace and other such websites86 add yet one more dimension—the 
dimension of exposure and exhibitionism.  On networks like MySpace you 
can disclose private facts about yourself, or an imaginary self, and use that 
to create a network on yourself, or leave photos or a video about yourself.  
Other new content networks are obviously more serious—such as Linked-
In87 which purports to help users develop their professional contacts and 
82
 http://www.youtube.com (last visited Jan. 7, 2007).  YouTube has recently been purchased by 
Google.  http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/google_youtube.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2007). The 
convergence of old and new networks into neo-networks is shown by the acquisition of MySpace.com 
by News Corp., owner of the Fox network.  http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content 
/jul2005/tc20050719_5427_tc119.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2007). 
83
 http://www.video.google.com (last visited Jan. 7, 2007). 
84
 The user can post virtually anything.  Many postings are simple interactions such as a mono-
logue, a song, or other personal communication.  Other popular posts include events that the interactor 
has been to, a parade or stage show, for example.  Certainly questions of copyright on some of these 
programs might be raised in the future, but for now the posts are popular.  Additionally, many commer-
cial media companies are posting material ranging from movie trailers and promotions to full-length 
shows. Because the computer images tend to be of a smaller size and lesser quality than the original 
television show, there is little chance of the commercial company adversely impacting the marketplace 
for their shows.   
85
 Web Junk 20 (VH1 television broadcast). 
86
 http://www.myspace.com (last visited Jan. 1, 2007).  See also http://www.facebook.com (Jan. 
1, 2007). 
87
 http://www.linkedin.com (last visited Jan. 1, 2007). 
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careers.  Yet each online service is really a content publisher, and when a 
user supplies his or her own content, he or she joins the network.88
Corporate clients are posting almost as often as individuals.  In addi-
tion to finding television shows such as CSI, Survivor, and MacGyver
posted,89 one can also find educational videos, movie trailers, and music 
videos all purposely posted by their corporate sponsors.  At iTunes, “pod-
cast” lectures in chemistry and financial education are common.90  Also, the 
neo-networks are having an influence on politics, including candid videos 
that may change the behavior of candidates.91
The final attribute of neo-networks is that distribution can be achieved 
through “layered networks.”  A layered network is the use of an intermedi-
ate distribution technology to reach the usual distribution technology of the 
content.  A simple example is using a cellular telephone network to 
download video content usually available on the Internet.92  These layered 
networks extend and enhance access.93  A new network diagram of the rela-
tionship of the viewer to the content has arisen and is demonstrated in illus-
tration #2.  
88
 Nielsen//Netratings reports that five of the top ten fastest growing web brands in July 2006 are 
“user generated content sites.” Press Release, Nielsen//NetRatings, User-Generated Content Drives Half 
of U.S. Top 10 Fastest Growing Web Brands, According to Nielsen//Netratings (Aug. 10, 2006), 
http://www.nielsen-netratings.com/pr/PR_060810.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2007). 
89
 These shows are posted at Google Video.  http://video.google.com/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2007). 
90
 http://www.apple.com/itunes/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2007). 
91
   David Mendell, Smile, Gov: You’re on Candid Video, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 1, 2006, § 2, at 3.  “Cam-
paign operatives toting handheld video cameras are dispatched to an opponent’s every public event.” 
The video is then posted to a site like YouTube.com.  The videos can further change the dialog of public 
policy.  For example, videos showing attacks against American Troops in Iraq are now showing up on 
popular video sharing websites. Edward Wyatt, Anti-U.S. Attack Videos Spread on Web, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 2006.  See also, Mike Dorning, Web’s Role Widens in Campaigns, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 9, 2006, at 1. 
92
 Reuters, Sprint to Offer Full-Length Movie Downloads, ZDNET NEWS, Dec. 11, 2005, 
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1035-5990711.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2007). 
93
 A layered network gives access to the original content through at least two “layers.”  The first 
might be the Internet, for example, and the second might be a cellular telephone network.  Video to a 
cellphone or a WiFi device is delivered on a layered network.  
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Chart 2: Neo Networking 
VI. CONCLUSION
The traditional networks have met their demise.  But the viewer has 
increased their media usage and the time engaged with content.  The con-
tent might have come from the same traditional networks as content provid-
ers, but it might also have come from many new sources including fellow 
interactive neo-networks.  The networks have lost their near monopoly on 
distribution and they are on an equal footing with other producers that range 
from high end media producers, such as cable networks, to mid-level inde-
pendent artists and producers, to people in their yard with a video camera 
and the ability to post to YouTube.com.  The world has changed to one 
where distribution is a commodity and the only important thing is how crea-
tive your content is and whether people are watching it. It is now a content-
driven world.   
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